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Abstract— We present vepRisk (Vulnerabilities, Exploits and 
Patches Risk analysis tool): a web-based tool for analyzing 
publically available security data. The tool has a backend modules 
that mine, extract, parse and store data from public repositories of 
vulnerabilities, exploits and patches; and a frontend web-based 
application that provides functionality for analyzing the data. The 
frontend uses shinyR, hence allowing integration with the R 
statistical analysis package and seamless use of R functions. We 
also present initial analysis we have done with the tool, and outline 
the extensions and future development we plan to integrate into 
the tool in the near future. 
Keywords— Security; Security data analysis; Security analysis 
tools; Data analysis 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are many publically available security data sources, 
which are actively used by researchers and industry (e.g. the 
National Vulnerability Database, exploitdb1, patch databases 
from the vendors etc.) to analyze current trends and assess their 
security exposure. Most of these resources provide an 
Application Programming Interface (API) that allows for the 
data to be mined and analyzed.  
Many quantitative studies have been carried out using public 
security data (e.g. [1], [2]). The main focus has been on the 
vulnerability lifecycle and studying individual vulnerability 
metrics. Others, such as the work from Frei et al. [3] have 
provided analysis of multiple risk factors (vulnerabilities, 
exploits and patches), but they considered a particular period of 
time (up to 2009 in [3]). This makes it difficult for an 
organization to assess their current risk exposure. What may 
benefit them is an online tool using the most up-to-date 
information on public security data, which has integrated 
multiple disparate but publically available data sources on 
security. For this reason, we built vepRisk2: a web based tool 
that provides a data integration platform with a frontend to allow 
researchers to analyze up-to-date publically available security 
datasets at any time online. 
vepRisk serves as a knowledgebase for public security data 
and provides a web interface for analyzing and visualizing the 
underlying data. It provides functionality for analyzing 
relationships between the different security risk factors in public 
                                                          
1 https://nvd.nist.gov/, https://www.exploit-db.com/  
security data.  So far we have mainly looked at the relationships 
in time (e.g. looking at the time series of the different events), 
but we plan to extend the tool with functionality informed by our 
research into data mining, machine learning and predictive 
probabilistic models (such as security growth models [4]) and to 
find trends and relationships in security data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II 
describes the architecture of vepRisk; section III describes initial 
results obtained with vepRisk; section IV references related 
work and finally section V outlines the conclusions and next 
steps in the vepRisk development.  
II. ARCHITECTURE OF THE VEPRISK TOOL 
     The vepRisk tool is a collection of interactive components. 
These components make up the backend and the frontend of the 
tool. They are used to collate, process, store and analyze public 
security data. Figure 1 shows a high level architectural view of 
the tool, and Figure 2 a more detailed view of the phases of data 
processing, analysis and visualization.  We will explain them in 
more detail in the next two sub-sections. 
 FIG 1: VEPRISK ARCHITECTURE: A HIGH LEVEL VIEW 
2 veprisk.city.ac.uk/main   
 
     
FIG 2: VEPRISK ARCHITECTURE: PHASES OF INFORMATION PROCESSING, 
ANALYSIS AND VISUALIZATION 
A. Backend 
The backend is made of three different modules: namely the 
data collation unit, the data extraction, parsing and cleaning unit 
and the data storage unit. These three modules work closely 
together to generate the data (stored in a MySQL database) that 
is then processed in the frontend. 
The configuration of the various data sources for which 
parsers will be developed is defined in the data collation unit. 
This configuration holds the links to the various data sources and 
configuration information such as login details to the database, 
location of temporary file directories etc. Gathering public 
security data using crawlers or spiders has some drawbacks 
because links to data sources might change or might not be 
available, the structure of the page might also change and cause 
spiders to break etc. These issues are resolved using modular 
structuring of the backend as shown in Figure 2. Each data 
source is a module. This modular structure provides the 
advantage of updating only data sources whose parsers are fully 
functional. Error messages generated by faulty parsers are used 
to diagnose the modules that failed and correct the errors before 
running the individual parsers. 
The data extraction, parsing and cleaning unit is made up of 
data parsers for each vulnerability, exploit and patch data source. 
Parsers are crawlers or scrapers designed to crawl the web and 
extract specific information about vulnerabilities, patches and 
exploits from the selected data sources. Currently we have 
parsers for six different vulnerability data sources (National 
Vulnerability Database data source3, Security database data 
source4, CVE data source5, CVE Details data source6, Security 
                                                          
3 https://nvd.nist.gov/  
4 https://www.security-database.com/  
5 http://cve.mitre.org  
6 http://www.cvedetails.com/  
7 http://www.securityfocus.com/  
8 https://cxsecurity.com/  
9 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletins.aspx  
focus data source7 and CXSECURITY data source8), various 
vendor patch sources (e.g. Microsoft9, Debian10, SUSE linux11, 
Cisco12 etc.,) and exploits from Exploit database13 (illustrated by 
the left-most column in Figure 2). Due to the modular structure 
of the data collation framework, more parsers for other security 
data sources can easily be added. 
     The data extraction, parsing and cleaning unit receives 
input from the data collation module and follows the links to 
download and process the data from these sources. It converts 
the data into a format that is defined in the database. For 
example, the vulnerability published date extracted from a 
vulnerability data source is converted into the date format in 
MySQL. It also processes and “cleans” text data by removing 
symbols (brackets and quotation marks) before storing the 
information in the database. Data validation is also performed in 
this module (e.g. the format of the Common Vulnerability 
Enumeration identifiers and the format of patch and exploit 
identifiers). These modules are represented by the second and 
third columns in Figure 2.  
The extracted data from various vulnerability, patch and 
exploit sources is stored in a MySQL database running in the 
data storage unit. Tables are created with referential integrity 
constraints between vulnerabilities, patches and exploits using 
the Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) identifier, patch 
identifiers and exploit identifiers. 
B. Frontend 
     To fully exploit the information collated, processed and 
stored by the vepRisk backend, we designed an easy to use 
frontend system for analyzing the data. The frontend has 
applications designed for the graphical overview of the data in 
the database, the analysis of inter-vulnerability, inter-patch and 
inter-exploit time series and using reliability models to find 
trends and correlations and also applications for the analysis of 
the vulnerability life cycle. These applications are designed 
using shiny14 from RStudio thus making use of powerful 
statistical and graphical libraries from the R project15. 
III. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS USING VEPRISK 
We now show some examples of the analysis that are 
supported by the current version of the vepRisk tool. The tool 
offers various counts of vulnerabilities by year, type etc. These 
features are not new to vepRisk – they are also available in many 
other sites that offer simple statistics. Nevertheless, they are a 
useful way for an analyst to start the analysis. 
Most of the current functionality offered in the tool is for 
time-series analysis per event type (i.e. times between 
vulnerabilities, exploits and patches), and between events (times 
between: a vulnerability and an exploit; a vulnerability and a 
patch; and an exploit and a patch). These are also subdivided by 
vendors, operating systems and applications. The data can also 
10 https://www.debian.org/security/  
11 https://www.suse.com/security/cve/  
12 https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x  
13 https://www.exploit-db.com/ 
14 https://shiny.rstudio.com/  
15 https://www.r-project.org/  
be filtered by vulnerability type, vulnerability severity score and 
can be selected for any given period of time (using the slider 
provided on the tool).  
A. Time-series analysis per event type 
Security analysts may be interested in analyzing the times 
between vulnerabilities of their chosen products so that they can 
assess and forecast vulnerabilities that could affect these 
products in the future. In vepRisk the inter-vulnerability time 
series shows scatter plots of times between vulnerability 
reporting dates. The vulnerabilities are ordered by reporting date 
and each point in the plot is the difference (in calendar days, 
shown in the y-axis) between two adjacent vulnerabilities in the 
ordered list (shown in the x-axis). If vulnerabilities are reported 
on the same day, the difference is 0. The graph also shows a 
cumulative series. An example for all Apple operating system 
vulnerabilities is shown in Figure 3-a.  The different types of 
vulnerabilities, as classified by NVD, are shown by the different 
colors on the right of the graph. The graph is interactive and the 
security analyst can, for example, choose to show just one (or 
more) of the vulnerabilities that they are interested in analyzing 
further. This is shown in figure 3-b, where the analyst has 
selected only the “Execute Code” (ExeC) vulnerabilities to be 
plotted. The analyst can then drill deeper and analyze 
vulnerabilities of different versions of Apple operating systems 
or applications.    
        a)    b) 
FIG. 3: APPLE INTER-VULNERABILITY TIME SERIES A) FOR VARIOUS 
VULNERABILITY TYPES B) FOR EXECUTE CODE VULNERABILITY TYPE ONLY  
 
The analyst can also plot these series side by side with 
(currently) up to four other vendors’ products to enable the 
analyst to easily compare and contrast the vulnerabilities 
reporting rates of different vendors for the same types of 
systems. This is shown in Figure 4. 
B. Inter-event time series analysis 
We have also added functionality to enable analysis of the 
inter-event times between vulnerabilities, patches and exploits. 
This analysis is inspired by the work from Frei et al  [3]. It allows 
an analyst to check how long it would take for a vulnerability to 
be exploited, for it to be patched, or for an exploited 
vulnerability to be patched. Since the inter-event times are 
calculated from public reporting dates, then some of these inter-
event times can be negative (e.g. a patch for a vulnerability can 
be reported earlier than the details of that vulnerability were 
made public in a vulnerability repository). 
Figure 5 shows an example of this analysis for Apple denial 
of service vulnerabilities. Sub-figure a) shows an ordered list of 
vulnerabilities by reporting date (x-axis) showing the days  
           a)    b) 
           c)    d) 
FIG. 4: INTER-VULNERABILITY TIME SERIES FOR OPERATING SYSTEMS OF 
FOUR DIFFERENT VENDORS.   
    a)     b) 
     c)     d) 
FIG 5: TIME (IN DAYS) BETWEEN VULNERABILITIES, EXPLOITS AND 
PATCHES FOR APPLE DENIAL OF SERVICE VULNERABILITIES. 
 
between a vulnerability report date and an exploit date for that 
vulnerability (blue dots); days between a vulnerability report 
date and a patch date (red dots); and days between a patch date 
and an exploit date (orange dots). Sub-figures b)-d) are scatter 
plots showing the relationships between any two of these inter-
event times (i.e. b) days between vulnerabilities to exploits vs 
days from vulnerabilities to patches; c) days between 
vulnerabilities to exploits vs days between patches and exploits; 
d) days between vulnerabilities to patches and days between 
patches and exploits). 
For Apple DoS vulnerabilities we see from sub-figure b) that 
there are a large number of zero-day vulnerabilities (i.e. the 
public vulnerability data and the exploit report date for that 
vulnerability is the same, as shown by the large cluster of blue 
dots on the 0 vale in the x-axis), and, worryingly, many of these 
vulnerabilities have patch dates published in some cases many 
months and years afterwards (as shown by blue dots in the y-
axis. Sub-figure c) gives a more detailed view on the “competing 
risks” between exploits and patches. The fact that only one 
Apple DoS vulnerability is below 0 in the y-axis tells us that, 
according to publically available data from these sources, this is 
the only vulnerability for which a patch was available before an 
exploit was reported.  A system owner would prefer all these 
dots to be below 0 in the y-axis. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
There have been several studies that have used public 
security data for various types of analysis. Examples include the 
work in [5] (statistical analysis and trends), [1] (application of 
vulnerability discovery models to vulnerability data), [2] 
(competing risk model using vulnerabilities, patches and 
exploits), [3] (analysis of trends and inter-event times between 
vulnerabilities, patches and exploits). 
In all of these studies the authors had to first download the 
data from multiple security repositories (in some cases using 
custom-made tools) and then do the analysis offline. The 
advantage of the vepRisk tool we are presenting here is to allow 
the data to be available from one place, to allow for online 
analysis with the most up-to-date datasets.  
Software Vulnerability Extraction and Analyzer (VEXA) [6] 
is an automated on-line tool that extracts information on 
vulnerabilities from different databases. However, compared 
with vepRisk, VEXA does not provide information for exploits 
or patches, or inter-event analysis functionality, and the tool is 
no longer available online. 
 vFeed16 is tool that provides a similar functionality to 
vepRisk. It crawls and integrates multiple data-sources together 
into one database. It also provides an API for accessing the data. 
However, it does not have the inter-event time frontend 
functionality that vepRisk provides and neither does it provide 
integration with ShinyR and ability to call R package functions. 
Nevertheless, there is scope for integrating vepRisk frontend 
functionality with vFeed which we will explore in the future.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
We presented vepRisk: a tool for public-security data 
integration and analysis. We have made vepRisk publically 
available for other researchers to use.  
The current functionality of vepRisk is primarily geared 
towards inter-event time analysis. Our current focus is on 
integrating functionality that allows for traditional reliability 
growth models to be used with the tool. Some initial integration 
with the R package “Reliability”17 has already been 
implemented in vepRisk. Next steps are to integrate more 
models, including those that have been specifically adapted for 
security, as well as more advanced features of reliability 
                                                          
16 https://github.com/toolswatch/vFeed  
modelling (such as u-plots and recalibration [7]) that allow for 
prediction accuracy to be assessed and for predictions to be 
calibrated.  
Since the frontend of vepRisk is built on top of ShinyR we 
can easily call R statistical package functions. We hence plan to 
build various frontend extensions to show statistical summaries 
such as averages, standard deviations, box and whisker plots 
etc., as well as statistical significance tests.   
There are limitations to using public security data for 
analysis and predictions, and hence conclusions that can be 
drawn from such analysis. The reporting dates of these events 
are the ones reported in the public sources from where the data 
is collected. Attackers and other nefarious actors may know 
about some of these vulnerabilities much earlier than when they 
are publically available. Hence the predictions that can be made 
using this data are limited to when events (vulnerabilities, 
patches, exploits) will first appear on these public sources. There 
are efforts from other researchers (e.g. in [8]) to incorporate 
early warnings about vulnerabilities and exploits from social 
networking sites. We plan to explore further how this research 
from other authors would allow for event information in vepRisk 
to be updated so that it more accurately reflects first known dates 
for these events. 
Other functionality we expect to integrate in vepRisk in the 
future includes: support for clustering analysis (such as principal 
component analysis) and other forms of machine learning; 
improve the way the information presented in vepRisk is 
communicated to the end users through data visualization - for 
this part we plan to collaborate more closely with colleagues in 
the giCentre (gicentre.net) at our university. 
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